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Defendant-Appellant 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from the Third District Court, in 
which defendant was convicted of the crime of assault by a prisoner, 
a felony of the third degree. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried on a two count information alleging that 
he committed the crimes of aggravated sexual assault and assault 
by a prisoner. The jury acquitted him of aggravated sexual assault 
but convicted him of assault by a prisoner. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order from this Coui^ t reversing his 
conviction and either vacating the conviction entirely or remanding 
the case for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the trial, Michael William Hart, convicted of first 
degree arson and second degree murder (T.13), testified that 
on January 15, 1976 while incarcerated in ffC" Section of the 
maximum security facility at the Utah State Prison, he was struck 
in the face by appellant's fist. (T.17) Hart testified he 
thought the assault was in response to his requests for money 
owed him by appellant (T.19). He further testified that the 
appellant forced him to submit to a sexual assault (T.24). This 
part of the witnesses1 testimony was not believed by the jury, 
at least not beyond a reasonable doubt, for the jury acquitted the 
appellant of this charge (T.321). 
Although several other persons testified at the trial, most 
testified to facts revolving around the sexual assault charge. 
Germain to this appeal, however, is the testimony of appellant himself. 
Appellant testified that during the month of January, 1976 
he had reason to be Mjumpy" because he believed someone was trying 
to harm him. He testified that at the time of the alleged assault 
on January 15, 1976 he was sitting in "C" Section of the maximum 
security facility. Edward L. Cornish, another inmate was sitting 
behind appellant and appellant heard Cornish yell Mwatch out". 
Appellant had had earphones on watching T.V.; he felt someone 
strike him in the shoulder simultaneously with Cornish's warning. 
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Appellant testified that because the individual came up behind 
his back, he feared he was in danger and struck out hitting the 
person, who turned out to be the alleged victim Michael William 
Hart. Appellant further testified he struck Hart because he 
thought he might be stabbed. (T. 213-247) 
Edward Cornish was called by appellant and confirmed 
appellant's version of the alleged assault. (T.191-209) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO ALLOW DEFENSE COUNSEL TO 
CROSS-EXAMINE THE WITNESS HART CONCERNING AGREEMENTS 
WITH THE STATE IN RETURN FOR HIS TESTIMONY DENIED 
APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The State's chief witness in this case was Michael Hart. 
During cross-examination of Mr. Hart by defense counsel, the 
following colloguy took place: 
Mr. Keller: And as a result of your testimony in this case 
the State has agreed to not send you back to the Utah State Prison, 
haven't they? 
Mr. Stott: I'm going to object. 
Court: Sustained. 
Mr. Keller: Your Honor. 
Court: Objection is sustained. 
Mr. Keller: I would like to argue that point, Your Honor, 
may we do so outside the presence of the jury? 
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Court: Ask your next question. 
Mr. Keller: May we at least approach the bench on it? 
Court: Ask your next question counsel, please. 
Mr. Keller: What other agreement did you make with the 
State of Utah for your testimony, Mr.--
Mr. Stott: I'm going to object to that, there isn't any 
evidence, he is assuming things. 
Court: Objection is sustained. 
Mr. Keller: Your Honor, we are entitled to know what agreements 
have been made with this man in return for his testimony against the 
defendant. There is a long line of case law that allows us to do 
that. 
Court: Ask your next question counsel. 
(T.60-61) 
Appellant maintains that this refusal by the trial court to 
allow defense counsel to bring out the nature of the State's agreement 
with the witness in return for his testimony was a denial of his 
right under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him and to be allowed full 
and complete cross-examination of such witnesses. It was, also 
a denial of appellant's right to Due Process of Law pursuant to 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
and Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah. 
The precept that Due Process of Law requires full and complete 
cross-examination of witnesses is so axiomatic that it seems unnecessar 
to provide documentation. Cross-examination is fundamental to 
preserve the right of confrontation of witnesses. Although numerous 
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cases and quotations could be cited, the statement by Mr. Justice 
Burger in the majority opinion in Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 
39 L. Ed. 2d 347, 94 S. Ct. 1105 (1974) best documents the point: 
Cross examination is the principal means by which 
the believability of a witness and the truth of his test-
imony are tested. Subject always to the broad discretion 
of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly 
harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only 
permitted to delve into the witness' story to test the 
witness' perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner 
has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e. discredit 
the witness. . . . A more particular attack on the witness' 
credibility is effected by means of cross-examination 
directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or 
ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly 
to issues or personalities in the case at hand. The 
partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, 
and is "always relevant as discrediting the witness and 
affecting the weight of his testimony." 3AJ. Wigmore 
Evidence §940,p775 (Chadbourn rev 1970). We have recognized 
that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying 
is a proper and important function of the constitutionally 
protected right of cross-examination. [415 US 317] 
Greene v. McElroy, 360 US 474, 496, 3 L.Ed 2d 1377, 79 S. 
Ct. 1400 (1959) 
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized this important 
Constitutional concept. In State v. Cerar, 60 Utah 208, 207 P. 
597 (1922) the Court said: 
"The interest of a witness in any particular case in which 
he becomes a witness may always be shown, and the effect, 
if any, of such interest upon the weight of the testimony 
is always a question for the jury." 207 P.at 602. 
In perhaps its most recent pronouncement on the issue, this 
Court held it was error for a trial judge to have refused to permit 
defense counsel to cross-examine a witness as to his interest and 
bias after the witness disclosed that a year jail sentence was 
to be shortened in return for his testimony against another in a 
criminal case. State v. Smelser, 23 Ut. 2d 347, 463 P.2d 562 (1970). 
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Although the Court held this error to be non-prejudicial because 
it involved testimony which was merely corroborative,1 the Court 
seemed to say that a defendant has a right to pursue the effect 
of an agreement with the state upon his testimony and it is error 
not to allow him to do so. But even more important, the decision 
seemed clear that the defendant was entitled to bring out the 
witnesses1 agreement or hoped for reduction in sentence as a possible 
reason for his not testifying fairly. The Court held that the trial 
court's refusal to allow counsel to go into the subject more 
deeply was error, but not prejudicial. 
In the instant case, counsel was not even allowed to 
inquire into the witnesses1 agreement with the State in return for 
his testimony, or even into what the witness hoped to gain through his 
testimony. Based on the Smelser case, this action by the trial 
judge constituted error and furthermore this error was prejudicial 
to appellant as it was not merely a question of how deeply counsel 
could question concerning the witnesses1 bias, but whether counsel 
could question him at all with regard to that possible bias. 
The United States Supreme Court addressed this very issue in 
Giglio v. United States, 465 U.S. 150, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104, 92 S. Ct. 
763 (1972). In that case, a witness for the government testified 
falsely that he had received no consideration in return for his 
testimony against the defendant Giglio. It was later revealed that 
1. 463 P.2d at 564. 
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unbeknownst to the prosecutor actually trying the case, another 
prosecucor had agreed not to prosecute the witness in another 
matter in return for his testimony. The Court reversed Giglios' 
conviction on the grounds that the perjured testimony and the 
government's failure to inform the jury of its agreement with the 
witness denied Giglio due process of law. Writing for the majority, 
Mr. Chief Justice Burger stated: 
"Taliento's credibility as a witness was therefore an 
important issue in the case, and evidence of any under-
standing or agreement as to a future prosecution would 
be relevant to his credibility and the jury was entitled 
to know of it." 31 L. Ed. 2d at 109. 
The Court in Giglio quoted from an earlier case, 
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217, 79 S. Ct. 
1173 (1959) in which a murder conviction was reversed because 
a government witness denied he would receive any consideration for 
his testimony, when in fact he had been promised consideration. 
The Supreme Court held in Napue that the due process cause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is violated where a witness testifies falsley 
as to the government's promises for his testimony. Mr. Chief Justice 
Warren, writing for a unanimous Court stated: 
". . . The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and 
reliability of a given witness may well be determinative 
of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors 
as the possible interest of the witness in testifying 
falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend." 
2 L.Ed. 2d at 1221 
Most important to the Utah Supreme Court's inquiry in the 
instant case, however, is the fact that the United States Supreme 
Court has, in at least two major cases, held that a jury is entitled 
to know what consideration, if any, is promised to a witness in 
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a criminal case in return for his testimony; and that if that witness 
testifies falsely in that regard, the defendant has been denied 
due process of law. But what jumps out as essential to that 
principle is the fact that due process of law requires that the jury 
be apprised of any consideration the witness is to receive for his 
testimony. If a trial judge is allowed to prevent a defendant from 
even inquiring into the subject in the first: place, isn!t that a 
clear denial of Due Process of law? And isn!t that what happened in 
the instant case? Appellant asks this Court: to establish clearly that 
in Utah, as in the rest of the country, due process of law requires the 
a trial judge allow defense counsel in a criminal case to inquire of 
a witness what consideration he has been promised in return for his 
testimony; and to do so by reversing this case and granting appellant 
a new trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT THE JURY WITH REGARD 
TO SELF-DEFENSE DENIED APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW. 
After both sides had rested and at the proper time, appellantfs 
counsel requested the following instruction: 
"A person is justified in threatening or using force against 
another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes 
that such force is necessary to defend himself or a third 
person against such other!s imminent use of unlawful 
force.,f 
This requested instruction copies verbatim the first sentence 
from Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402(1) (as amended 1973). After hearing 
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extensive argument on the matter (T.249-263), the trial court 
refused to allow this instruction to be given to the jury (T.263). 
Appellant argues that the Court effectively denied him his right 
to due process of law by not allowing him to argue, nor instructing 
the jury upon, his theory of the case: to-wit that appellant 
struck Hart in self-defense. 
There was no argument concerning the accuracy of the 
language (taken directly from the statute) in the requested 
instruction (T.249-263). The Court seemed to deny the requested 
instruction because it did not believe that unlawful force was 
used against appellant (T.250, 251). Appellant believes that the 
Court was in error concerning both the evidence and the law on 
this matter and by refusing to give the requested instruction 
the Court effectively took over the function of the jury, i.e. 
finding the facts of the case. 
A. 
THE EVIDENCE 
The witness Thomas Gurule (incorrectly spelled in the Trial 
Transcript as Rulae or Grulae, see T. 164-170) testified that 
during mid-January of 1976 that appellant was f,jumpyn (T.168). 
Appellant himself testified that during the month of January, 1976 
he was "jumpy" and concerned about his personal safety due to an 
incident which occurred in the maximum security kitchen (T.214-215). 
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Edward Cornish testified that on the date and at the time in 
question, he was in the common area of MCft section watching 
television with appellant; that he was sitting behind appellant 
who had earphones on, when Michael Hart walked in and into his 
(Hart's) cell; that Hart came back out of his cell with a faster 
pace toward where appellant was sitting with his back to him; 
that he yelled, "lookout Harry !" and that appellant turned and 
apparently hit Hart. (T.194-196) 
Appellant confirmed Cornish's version of the events on the 
day in question. He testified that he was sitting watching T.V. 
with earphones on one ear and that he was struck on the shoulder 
from behind with some commisary slips contemporaneous with 
Cornish1s warning of "Watch out!11 He further testified that he 
struck Cornish because "he was on me so fast I didn't know why 
he was there" (T.218). Appellant stated that he had been stabbed 
in the back before in prison and that the combination of events 
caused him to strike Hart in self-defense (T.218-220). 
The sum total of this evidence then was that (a) Appellant 
was in a unique environment, prison, where one has to be more concerned 
for his own personal safety than in any normal environment; (b) that 
he had been stabbed before in prison; (c) that Hart came up behind 
his back, struck him with some papers, however lightly, just as 
fellow inmate Edward Cornish yelled "Lookout Harr^'or ""Watch out!"; 
(d) that he instinctively struck the man in self-defense. 
Now it may very well be that the jur}r would not have believed th 
any or all of the above listed items acted as a justification for 
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appellant's assault on Hart, but this evidence clearly shows that 
the trial court was incorrect when it noted on the requested self-
defense instruction: 
"Refused-no substantive evidence to warrant giving 
the instruction." (R.74 1/2). 
Since the jury was never instructed as to self-defense it was 
never able to consider the full meaning of this evidence. 
B. 
THE LAW 
As early as 1943, the Utah Supreme Court held that each party 
is entitled to have his theory of the case, if supported by 
competent evidence, submitted to the jury by appropriate instructions. 
In State v. Newton, 105 Ut. 561, 144 P.2d 290 (1943) the court 
said: 
,rWe have held that each party is entitled to have his 
theory of the case which is supported by competent 
evidence, submitted to the jury by appropriate 
instructions; and that the failure to present for the 
jury's consideration a party's theory by appropriate 
instructions constitutes reversible error." 
144 P.2d at 292. 
The Court reaffirmed that principle in State v. Johnson, 
112 Ut. 130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947); State v. Castillo, 23 Ut. 2d 70, 
457 P.2d 618 (1969); and State v. Gillan, 23 Ut. 2d 372, 463 P.2d 
811 (1970). The Castillo case is especially important for our 
inquiry here. In that case, this Court reaffirmed the now-axiomatic 
principle that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to have 
the jury instructed on his theory of the case by saying: 
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"Both the State and defendant agree that a defendant is 
entitled to have a jury instructed on his theory of the 
case, if there be any substantial evidence to justify 
giving such an instruction.11 457 P. 2d at 620. 
In Castillo, this Court was called upon to review a case in 
which the defense had requested a self-defense jury instruction 
in an assault with a deadly weapon case; which request was refused 
by the trial court. Although the Court did not precisely rule on 
that issue, it held that: 
11
. . .we are unable to conclude that the result of this 
case would have been different had the jury been 
instructed on the question of self-defense . . ." 
457 P.2d at 620. 
Despite that holding, the Court enunciated clearly when a 
self-defense instruction should be given by a trial court: 
"If the defendant's evidence, although in material conflict 
with the State1s proof, be such that the jury may entertain 
a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he acted in self-defense 
he is entitled to have the jury instructed fully and clearly 
on the law of self-defense. Conversely, if all reasonable 
men must conclude that the evidence is so slight as to be 
incapable of raising a reasonable doubt in the jury's 
mind as to whether a defendant accused of a crime acted in 
self-defense, tendered instructions thereon are properly 
refused." 457 P.2d at 620 
It is helpful to see what facts the Court relied on to 
affirm the judgement in that case: 
"Defendant admits that he barged into his victim's 
dwelling, a victim whom he had previously beaten. 
He came armed with a knife in anticipation of trouble, 
although his sole ground for apprehension was his 
observation of a stick under a couch cushion on a prior 
occasion. He claims that he has absolutely no recollection 
of his victim being stabbed but merely hypothesizes that 
apparently she sustained wounds to two diverse parts of 
her body while he was legitimately exercising his right of 
self-defense." 457 P.2d at 620. 
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It seems clear that the facts in that case differ 
significantly from the instant case where the appellant and the 
victim shared a common outside cell area; appellant was not armed 
"in anticipation of trouble"; and the alleged assault was not by 
a man with a weapon upon a woman. It seems clear from Castillo's 
facts that a self-defense instruction was not proper, but those 
facts are far removed from the facts in the instant case. 
It is clear that appellant was entitled to have the jury 
instructed on his theory of the case and the facts discussed in 
Part A of this Point outlined a situation in which a trier of fact 
could reasonably have believed appellant struck Hart, in self-
defense. The trial court's refusal to instruct on self-defense 
constituted prejudicial error and appellant believes he should be 
entitled to a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons previously presented, appellant urges this 
Court to reverse his conviction and grant him a new trial. 
Resp^eptfully submitted 
LARRY^R. KELLER ' 
Attorney/for Appellant 
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